


# SALT II: Two Views



United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs

April 1979



*As the SALT II agreements neared completion, the following two speeches, delivered April 4 and 5, presented perspectives from the White House and the Defense Department.*

## SALT II and National Security

*Remarks by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at the Annual Members Dinner of the Chicago Committee of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations at the Art Institute of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, April 4, 1979.*

The United States and the Soviet Union are on the verge of an historic achievement: completion of a comprehensive agreement on limiting strategic offensive nuclear forces. Our nation has been striving to achieve this goal since the SALT negotiations began nearly 10 years and three Administrations ago. Today, I want to talk with you about the importance of this SALT agreement in terms of our national security and our relations with the Soviet Union.

The signing of the SALT II agreement will engage us in a vigorous and, we hope, enlightening national debate leading to Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty. Equally important, this national dialogue should produce a fresh consensus for policies to insure our national security in the 1980's. President Carter began this dialogue in his recent address at Georgia Tech. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown will be

discussing military and defense aspects of the treaty tomorrow in New York City.

The security of the United States can only be achieved through the full participation of our elected leaders and of the American people. As we all realize, the issues which challenged us in negotiating SALT II will not disappear once the agreement is signed and ratified. Protecting our strategic interests and pursuing a constructive strategic relationship with the Soviet Union will remain on our national agenda as far into the future as we can see. As a result, our policies must be based on realism, patience, and wisdom about the future. The American people must understand these policies. So must our allies. So must the leaders of the Soviet Union.

### SALT and U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R.

As President Carter has stated, U.S.-Soviet relations will continue to be a mixture of competition and cooperation. Our policies must be designed to pursue both, and to draw an effective balance between the two—seeking to broaden cooperation where we can, but effectively meeting the challenge of the competition where we must.

The Soviet Union is a military super-power that is now pressing forward to become a true global power. In some parts of the world, the Soviet Union challenges our security interests and those of our close friends and allies.

In pursuing its goals, the Soviet Union relies primarily on its military power. This is its strength—strength which we match—but in many ways it is also the source for its weakness. By diverting massive resources from its civilian economy to build its military machine, the Soviet Union has weakened the strength of its society.

In contrast, the United States enjoys many unique assets: our economic and technological dynamism; our thriving and stable society; our government which can count on genuine public participation and support; our ability to count on allies who have joined with us in free association.

The Soviet Union's ideological appeal has flagged at home and abroad. Its economic and political systems are models for none. Perhaps most remarkable is its political isolation, as it has discovered that it is difficult to transform raw military power into political gain. It has allies, clients, and proxies. But these are associations usually defined by Soviet might, not by mutual respect or self-interest.

The limits on open and free Soviet political engagement with the community of nations—relationships which we enjoy in full measure—force the Soviet Union to concentrate on its military power to gain influence. This leads it to be both more assertive toward others and more fearful of its own position—a combination that poses deep challenges to our steadfastness and resolve. We are meeting these challenges today; we will continue to do so in the future.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has gradually come to understand the risks of a competition that is so heavily influenced by military issues. It is a nation that directly suffered the full brunt of the worst conflict of modern times. With us, the Soviet Union has come to recognize that SALT can help contain the risks of nuclear holocaust which would flow from unrestrained competition in strategic arms. As a result, SALT, in the context of programmed U.S. strategic capabilities, can provide the needed strategic stability for progress in political relations between our two countries.

#### Acronyms

ABM: anti-ballistic missile  
ALCM: air-launched cruise missile  
ASBM: air-to-surface ballistic missile  
ASW: anti-submarine warfare  
BMBR: heavy bomber  
CM: cruise missile  
CONUS: continental United States  
FBS: forward-based systems  
FRODS: functionally-related observable differences  
GLCM: ground-launched cruise missile  
HB: heavy bomber  
ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile  
IRBM: intermediate-range ballistic missile  
kt: kiloton  
MAP: multiple aim-point  
MIRV: multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicle  
MLBM: modern, large ballistic missile  
MRBM: medium-range ballistic missile  
MRV: multiple reentry vehicle  
MT: megaton  
MW/CM: multiple-warhead cruise missile  
MX: missile experimental  
NTM: national technical means  
ODs: observable differences  
PBV: post-boost vehicle  
RV: reentry vehicle  
SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks  
SAM: surface-to-air missile  
SCC: Standing Consultative Commission  
SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile  
SLCM: sea-launched cruise missile  
SNDV: strategic nuclear delivery vehicle  
SRAM: short-range attack missile  
SSBN: nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

Even with this SALT agreement, the competitive elements of our relations with the Soviet Union will remain. We will need a sustained and long-term effort to protect our interests and those of our friends. But this competition can be managed more safely and effectively if our two nations can and will contain the dangers of nuclear confrontation, through the agreed and reciprocal exercise of restraint.

In pursuing mutual restraint through SALT, we are concerned not only about the Soviet Union of today, but also about the Soviet Union of tomorrow. During the next several years, the Soviet leadership will change. We cannot predict the character of the new leaders, or all the major aspects of future Soviet policy. But we can work now to insure that Soviet leaders of the present and the future will understand the policies and purposes of the United States—both our determination to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies, and our desire to broaden detente and cooperation.

When the next generation of Soviet leaders decides its policies toward strategic arms and toward the United States, we want them to face clear and agreed restraints on the competition in strategic arms. We want these to be the restraints of SALT II, not the milder restraints of the SALT I interim agreement. We want them to see convincing evidence that the United States recognizes its interests and will successfully defend them whatever the challenge. And we want them to know how they can join with us to further detente and cooperation.

That is a vital objective of the new SALT agreement: helping to determine the way in which the Soviet Union will see future relations with the United States—setting limits *now* on its actions in the strategic field, and increasing the chances that limits on these arms can lead to more peaceful relations.

## What is SALT?

Our goals in SALT are the same as our goals in overall strategic policy: to promote greater stability, to reduce incentives for either side to *use* nuclear force, to limit pressures to *build up* strategic arms, and to *guarantee* the security of our national interests and those of our friends and allies.

The SALT Treaty of 1972 sharply limited deployment of antiballistic missile systems on both sides; it averted a costly and dangerous ABM competition which neither side wanted but which both feared the other was about to initiate. We reached a comprehensive agreement with relative ease because extensive ABM deployment had not yet begun, and neither side was confident that its ABM technology would be effective.

The challenges involved in negotiating a comprehensive agreement on limiting strategic offensive arms have been far greater because both sides already have large deployments of these systems. Moreover, marked differences in the composition of Soviet and American offensive forces have made it extremely difficult to define limitations that are both balanced and equitable.

But we have persevered, and the expected agreement will go far beyond the interim SALT agreement. It is much more comprehensive and better suited to America's strategic needs. Let me outline some of the major accomplishments of the SALT II agreement:

- For the first time, it sets *equal* ceilings on all major intercontinental strategic delivery systems, as well as important subcategories of MIRVed missiles;
- It imposes an effective upper limit on the number of warheads that can be placed on each MIRVed ICBM. This is critically important because it simplifies our future strategic planning and adds more certainty to our military projections; and

- The treaty limits each side to developing and deploying one completely new ICBM before 1985. This provision will inhibit the *qualitative* expansion of the arms race, while still permitting us to develop an entirely new ICBM and a more secure basing mode for our ICBM force. This we need to do because improvements in Soviet military capacity are increasing the threat to our Minuteman ICBMs. The SALT treaty gives us the flexibility to solve this problem.

SALT II goes beyond SALT I, in all these provisions, by setting *equal* ceilings for the categories of weapons it covers. This requirement reflects a key demand expressed by the Senate when SALT I was negotiated. This negotiated principle of equality will require an actual *reduction* in the Soviet Union's intercontinental forces. They will have to eliminate more than 250 systems, and the importance of this step should not be underestimated. It may well be the forerunner of more substantial and significant reductions by both sides.

It is also important to recognize that the SALT II treaty runs only through 1985. While our long-term goal is a permanent treaty, the development of offensive weapons remains far too dynamic for us to make confident predictions about the late 1980's and beyond. But the SALT II treaty does markedly reduce our uncertainty about Soviet forces in the early 1980's—a period in which we must improve our own strategic forces, especially to allow them to survive in the face of potential Soviet attack. These necessary improvements on our part would be far more costly, and we would be far less confident about their success if we were without the limits which SALT II will impose on Soviet forces.

We have long recognized that SALT II would have little value if we could not be confident that its provisions were being followed by the Soviet Union. That is why verification was such an important issue in the negotiations.

The treaty reflects our concerns. It unambiguously establishes that verification is a necessary component of arms control agreements in general, and SALT II specifically. It establishes that national technical means of verification, such as satellite photography, are legitimate tools for insuring compliance. It prohibits both interference with these tools and deliberate concealment that could impede the collection of necessary information. And the agreement mandates that both sides follow special procedures to make verification easier.

These important steps significantly reduce the uncertainty about the threat each country faces. One of the major triggers of increased arms competition is uncertainty about what *might* exist. And the SALT II treaty takes a critical step toward reducing that uncertainty.

It should also be underscored that the SALT II treaty allows us to proceed with the force improvements that we need within a structure of predictability and confidence.

## What SALT Is Not

This is how the SALT II agreement will enhance our security and provide the basis for further limits on strategic arms in the future. But a sensible evaluation of the SALT II agreement also requires clear understanding of what it does not do . . . and what it *cannot* do.

First, and most important, the SALT II treaty is not an agreement based on trust. It stands on its own merits based on common interest, expressed in hard bargaining and compromises. It provides for adequate verification of essential provisions: It is backed up by strong U.S. capabilities to respond to both present and future military needs.

Clearly, the SALT II treaty will also not signal the end of East-West competition. Where our interests are threatened, we shall defend them. And where we can broaden detente, and achieve new forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union, we shall seek to do so, as well.



SALT II is not the end of military competition with the Soviet Union, even in strategic arms. During the last two decades, the Soviet Union has expanded and modernized its armed forces in all areas. Its steadily growing defense budget consumes more than 10 percent of Soviet GNP. As a result, we are confronted in many areas with military competition to which we must respond.

The SALT II treaty will keep those requirements lower than they would otherwise be in one area—strategic arms—but it will not end them. The most urgent problem we face is the growing vulnerability of our ICBM force. In addition, we must modernize and improve our theater nuclear and conventional forces. We can and shall do so, and nothing in the SALT II treaty prevents us from taking these necessary steps on our own and with our allies.

No one should regard the SALT II treaty as a way to impose comprehensive constraints on everything that the Soviet Union does in its military and foreign policy, much less on what it does within its own society. In our own national debate about SALT, some observers question whether we can sign an agreement when the Soviet Union continues to act against our interests in many areas abroad, and fails to recognize basic human rights at home. They thus insist on linkage.

Our position on linkage is clear. We believe that limitations on strategic arms are desirable in themselves. The quest for such limitations should not be held hostage either to other American or Soviet policies or to competition between us. We do not accept any linkage, for example, between closer U.S.-Chinese cooperation on a variety of issues and SALT, and we would strongly reject any Soviet effort to impose such a negative connection. By the same token, we cannot insist that the Soviet Union accommodate us in regard to matters of concern to us as a condition for an agreement with the United States on strategic limitations.

To impose such a linkage would mean that no problem in the U.S.-Soviet relationship could be solved unless all major issues were resolved simultaneously. This is not a prescription for policy but for paralysis.

Accordingly, our task is to obtain a good SALT agreement and to meet as appropriate Soviet challenges where and when they arise.

### Criticisms and Rebuttals

In the weeks ahead, the SALT II agreement will be subjected to searching discussion by the Senate and by the people of the United States. And that, in our democracy, is the way it should be. It is impossible to negotiate an agreement on anything that will please everyone. Critics of the SALT II treaty will raise a wide variety of objections. I think it might help to clear the air if I tried to answer some of the more common criticisms of this agreement.

It will be maintained that the agreement does not go far enough, that the ceilings are too high, and that the limitations are too modest. Let me assure you that no one agrees more sincerely with this criticism than President Carter. Yet he recognizes—and we all need to—that the pursuit of the best cannot be permitted to stand in the way of achieving the good. The achievements of the SALT II treaty are useful and real. They move the prospects for peace and stability far ahead of where they would be in the absence of this treaty. The road to achieving more ambitious strategic arms control lies in approving this agreement, and then moving ahead toward greater goals.

There will be those who will argue that this agreement—despite the principle of equality on which its essential provisions are based—will impose a degree of strategic inferiority on our nation. I believe these criticisms are unwarranted, alarmist, and I would like to explain why:

- It will be said that the Soviet Union is permitted to have very heavy missiles, while ours are much lighter. Yet we have never had an interest in building heavier missiles ourselves, relying instead on our qualitative advantages. And we have achieved in SALT II a truly important restriction on how the Soviets can exploit their heavy missiles by limiting the number of warheads each can carry;
  - It will be said that the agreement fails to cover the Backfire bomber, which could reach the United States. Yet, the agreement also does not constrain our F-111 bombers based in Britain, or other aircraft which could also be used against the Soviet Union; and
  - It will be said that the agreement includes limits on cruise missiles which are more important to us than to the Soviet Union. Yet, we are permitted to mount a sizable force of air-launched cruise missiles, without a limit on their range. And limits on sea-launched and land-launched cruise missiles will expire well before we could deploy them.
- I cite these examples—and there will be more—for a simple reason: We have gained or retained one or more advantages for ourselves for every one we have granted the Soviet Union. And where any Soviet capability truly presents a military problem, we are free, within the terms of the agreement to respond in appropriate ways to guarantee our security. This is what it means to have a good and equitable agreement; not symmetry of systems, but a framework for equal security.
- Furthermore, much criticism of the SALT II treaty will focus on whether it can be adequately verified. *We are fully confident that it can.* We maintain a vast, sophisticated, and expensive array of means to detect and monitor what the Soviet Union is doing in its strategic programs. They are totally under our own control; in no way do they require us to simply trust Soviet good will. These means help us to overcome a major difference between



our two countries—our open society versus their closed one. We are able to monitor many aspects of the development, testing, production, deployment, training, and operation of Soviet strategic forces, despite the closed nature of Soviet society, and despite Soviet obsession with secrecy.

To be sure, no means of verification can be absolutely perfect. Yet, through our enormous efforts—harnessing the world's most advanced technology and the skills of many tens of thousands of our most highly trained people—we are confident that we can detect any significant violation of the SALT II agreement well before we would have to react militarily to such a violation. And the SALT II treaty will continue the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva, to which either we or the Soviets can refer any question of compliance with the treaty.

While negotiating SALT II, it has been vitally important for us to protect the security and the interests of our NATO Allies, as well as our own. We have consulted with our Allies on SALT II at every step of the process, with a thoroughness and intensity that has few precedents.

We have assured our Allies that their interests will be fully met by this treaty. The best evidence of the success of our continual efforts to work with our Allies on SALT II can be seen in their response: strong support for this treaty by Allied leaders, including public statements at Guadeloupe by Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Callaghan, and President Giscard.

We are also determined that the continuing SALT process not divert our attention from the continuing challenge of Soviet military power or undermine our resolve to meet it. This resolve is unrelated to the merits of the proposed agreement, but rests instead on our own good sense and national will.

With or without the SALT talks, with this agreement or any conceivable alternative, we would still face the tasks of judging the military challenge to the United States and our Allies, and of responding effectively to it. In *any* event, we would have to provide for the common defense in sober and realistic terms. And in *any* event we will do so.

During the next several years we will need to make a number of difficult choices about our force posture in several areas. We shall make these choices in the sober realization that the United States must have military strength sufficient to deter any attack on us or our Allies, to enable us to deal successfully with any attack and at any level—should an attack occur, and to defend our interests and those of our friends and Allies around the world.

### **The Future of SALT**

The SALT II agreement is a major step forward in strategic arms control. But it is only one step. In the future, it will be important for us to move promptly on a complex agenda of arms control issues, including significant reductions in strategic weapons, further qualitative limitations on weapons, and still further improvements in our ability to verify arms control agreements. And at every step of the way, we will work closely with our NATO Allies, to insure that our efforts in SALT III will advance their security as well as our own.

We shall continue to press for more and better strategic arms control agreements. But we shall not hold our own needed defense programs hostage to the uncertain prospects of future arms control. Nor shall we hesitate to halt any defense program whose military requirement is effectively and safely removed by successful arms control agreements.

Finally, as we judge the SALT II treaty, we must remember precisely what is being achieved. The SALT process is an effort unique in human history. Never before have two very different and powerful competing nations engaged in an effort to limit their freedom of action in matters vital to their own survival and that of mankind. Never before have two such nations recognized that greater security can come from mutual self-restraint in building their most destructive weapons, rather than from continuing an unbridled competition. This mutual understanding is not based upon trust, or upon ignoring our deep and continuing differences. Rather, it is a recognition of the critical importance of reducing strategic uncertainties and the risks of nuclear crises and devastation. Our efforts in controlling nuclear weapons will continue to be difficult, halting, and uncertain. It will require our patience, wisdom, and unparalleled efforts to make sound judgments. But I think you will agree that it is a noble effort to achieve goals that are vital to ourselves and to all mankind.

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# SALT II and the National Defense

*Secretary of Defense Harold Brown  
before the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy  
Association, New York, April 5, 1979.*

I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak with you about strategic arms limitations and the national defense. I am convinced—and I believe that the President, and many of you, agree—that the emerging SALT agreement with the Soviet Union will be the single most significant bilateral understanding reached by the two global superpowers during the 1970s.

SALT has become part of the fabric of international relationships. It is an element of stability not only in military terms but in the worldwide political balance. Experience has shown that SALT alone cannot end the political competition between us and the Soviet Union, nor can it fulfill all our hopes for cooperation—or all our needs for strategic security. But, as the President's National Security Adviser suggested yesterday, it is necessary to the prudent management of both aspects of our relationship.

Because of the agreement's profound importance, it is essential that the public debate concerning its merits be not only thorough, but also well informed. In speaking here today I hope to contribute to both of those essential qualities.

Let me begin my discussion of SALT and the national defense by reporting

to you on the status of the talks. Although we are very close to an agreement, there are at least two or three remaining major issues—especially those involving verification and limits on new missiles—of such importance that we must know that they have been resolved satisfactorily before we can be confident a SALT II treaty can be achieved. Whether—and therefore when—agreement can be reached depends largely on the negotiation of these issues. The prospects, in my view, continue to be good.

Under our system of government, of course, the final U.S. decision on whether or not a treaty will take effect will be made by the Senate. Thus, the formal debate over ratification will be conducted in the Senate and will not start until a treaty is signed and submitted to that body. As a practical matter, however, the debate over SALT II has already begun and, in fact, has been underway for as long as or longer than the negotiations themselves. Moreover, the debate is a far-reaching one and has, properly, addressed our broader strategic policy objectives and programs, as well as the provisions of the agreement itself.

I believe the key question each of us must answer centers on the agreement itself: will its approval make the United States more secure than lack, or rejection, of an agreement? But that question can be answered—and SALT can properly be evaluated—only in the context of: U.S. strategic weapons policy and objectives; the state of the U.S.-Soviet balance now and as we expect it in the future; and the programs that we have undertaken to implement our strategic policy.

### The Soviet Challenge

Our national security derives from much more than our military strength. The military balance is only a part—but a vital part—of our total national security posture. There is no doubt that Soviet military power today is much greater than it was in the 1960's—both in absolute terms and relative to our own. There has been a steady increase in Soviet military spending during each of the past 15 years. Our current estimate is that it would cost us \$40 billion more than we now spend each year on our own defense establishment to support military forces and programs of the size and nature pursued by the Soviets.

Today, the military balance between East and West is one of rough equivalence—but with troubling trends appearing in both strategic and tactical nuclear areas. It is not the current balance but rather the momentum of Soviet strategic programs that is cause for concern.

Despite Soviet military accomplishments, the Soviet Union does not now enjoy a military advantage in nuclear terms; it is not in a position to exploit its strategic weapons or embark on a course that may lead to the use of nuclear weapons without themselves encountering unacceptable risks. A strategic balance exists today because the deterrent forces on the two sides are essentially equivalent. Neither side could launch a first-strike that would

prevent the other side from responding with a retaliation of devastating proportions. Neither side can effectively intimidate the other with its strategic forces.

In the face of these circumstances of Soviet challenge and competition, we are pursuing, and need to continue, two complementary courses of action.

The first is to ensure, within SALT constraints, that our strategic forces are capable of meeting our defense objectives despite the continued Soviet strategic buildup. The 1980 defense budget and our five-year defense program for 1980-84 are designed to do this.

The second is to seek, in a SALT II agreement, specific and verifiable provisions constraining Soviet strategic forces as part of the process of limiting further the strategic arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

### U. S. Objectives

Two concepts underlie U.S. strategic forces planning: deterrence and essential equivalence.

Deterrence of nuclear war is our most fundamental defense objective. A credible deterrent can be achieved only if we possess the military force necessary to persuade our enemies that, whatever the circumstances, if they start a course of action that could lead to war they will either:

- pay an unacceptable price to achieve their objective, or
- be frustrated in their effort to achieve that objective.

Our basic strategy requires us to be able to inflict such damage on a potential adversary that, regardless of the circumstances, the prospect of that damage will preclude his attack on the United States, our allies, or our vital interests. To achieve this we need, first of all, a survivable capability to devastate the industry and cities of the Soviet Union. Assured destruction capability—

which is what I've just defined—is the bedrock of nuclear deterrence. It is not, however, in my judgment, sufficient in itself as a strategic doctrine. Massive retaliation may not be appropriate, nor will its prospect always be sufficiently credible, to deter the full range of actions we seek to prevent.

We need capabilities convincingly able to do, and sure to carry out, under any circumstances the *Soviets* consider realistic, whatever damage the Soviets consider will deter *them*. Put differently, the perceptions of those whom we seek to deter can determine what is needed for deterrence in various circumstances. For fully effective deterrence, we need to be able to respond at the level appropriate to the type and scale of a Soviet attack. Fully effective deterrence requires forces of sufficient size and flexibility to attack selectively a range of military and other targets and to enable us to hold back a significant reserve.

This ability to provide measured retaliation in response to less-than-total attacks—and thus to prevent the Soviets from imagining that they can gain meaningful advantage at some level of nuclear conflict—is essential to credible deterrence. Moreover, whatever doubts one may have about whether a nuclear war could be kept limited—and I have severe ones—it would be the height of folly to put the United States in a position in which uncontrolled escalation would be the only course we could follow.

By any reasonable standard, we have a credible deterrent today and will have one for the foreseeable future. We have, and will continue to have, survivable forces capable of massive destruction of Soviet cities and industrial potential, even after an all-out surprise attack. We also have—and will have increasingly in the coming years—both the forces and the targeting and employment policies that allow for selective use of nuclear force to respond to more limited provocations. The rapid Soviet buildup



in strategic forces over the past decade, as compared to our own more modestly paced improvements in forces, should not obscure the basic power and credibility of our deterrent.

Moreover, the problems we face—in particular the growing vulnerability of our fixed silo ICBMs—will not force us to choose between all-out attacks on cities, on the one hand, and surrender, on the other. Our capacity to make selective strikes at military and other targets, while maintaining a reserve, is large now and will grow in the future despite ICBM vulnerability.

Essential equivalence—our second broad objective—is somewhat different from credible deterrence. It is one possible criterion for such deterrence, particularly if we want our nuclear forces to have an effect that goes beyond deterrence of an all-out strategic surprise attack. The use of essential equivalence as an objective reflects the reality that nuclear forces—like other military forces—have a broader political role, not entirely determined by technical, static (force-counting), or even dynamic (war-gaming) calculations of military capability.

As long as our relationship with the Soviet Union is more competitive than cooperative—and this is clearly the case in military terms—maintaining essential equivalence of strategic nuclear forces is necessary to prevent the Soviets from gaining political advantage from a real or perceived strategic imbalance.

Essential equivalence thus demands that our forces not only be on a par with those of the Soviet Union, but be seen to be so. We need not—we should not—imitate Soviet forces in an inevitably futile, immensely costly, and potentially very dangerous effort to match or exceed the Soviets in every conceivable index of strategic power. To say, however, we can tolerate some “gaps” that are offset by U.S. advantages by other measures is not to say we can tolerate an overall imbalance whether perceived or real.

Today, essential equivalence exists. While the Soviets have certain advantages, such as ICBM throw-weight and deliverable megatonnage, we now have offsetting advantages in numbers of warheads, accuracy, and antisubmarine warfare capability.

Most importantly, while no one can assuredly predict the outcome of any nuclear exchange, neither we nor the Soviets would gain, in any rational sense from such a conflict.

It's worth considering, for a moment, whether these objectives are ambitious enough.

- Ought we to be satisfied with equivalence and with preventing Soviet actions by deterrence?
- Ought we instead to seek to exploit our resources and our technology to attain strategic superiority?

In the first place, massive numerical superiority in strategic forces, even when we had it in the 50's and 60's, proved to be no panacea for our military needs, and still less for our diplomatic problems. We and our allies required strong conventional forces for our security.

The potential futility of any quest for superiority derives, I believe, from the realities of nuclear weaponry and bilateral superpower relations. Modern nuclear weapons technology is such that while equivalence is a realistic goal, superiority is not, *providing* that the other side is determined to prevent it. Each superpower can, by actions that are well within its technical and economic capability, prevent the other from gaining an overall advantage, much less supremacy.

The system is not self-equilibrating; neither equivalence nor even deterrence will be maintained automatically. Avoiding inferiority requires us to have the will and resolve to do the things that

will enable us to maintain the strategic balance. For, if the Soviets ever were to achieve superiority, I am convinced they would make every effort to exploit it politically, and even militarily. I am confident that we will continue to show the will and resolve to prevent the Soviets from attaining superiority. But I think it would be equally wrong to suppose that the Soviets, challenged to a race for superiority, would passively yield such an advantage to us.

In brief, equivalence and deterrence are at one and the same time our maximum feasible—and our minimum tolerable—objectives. And at present, our forces meet those objectives.

But if the present balance is adequate in terms of our objectives of deterrence and equivalence, we face challenges for the future that we can ignore only at great peril. If today we are in a satisfactory relationship vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, what of tomorrow, less rhetorically, what will the strategic balance be like during the planning horizons we can reasonably contemplate?

Some trends are of real concern. The Soviets are rapidly catching up to us in a number of key areas where we have led in the past, especially in the areas of accuracy and reentry vehicle numbers. Additionally, the improvements the Soviets have made in long-range theater nuclear forces may be of great significance as the central balance becomes more equal. Further, the growing vulnerability of our land-based missile force in the early 1980's could, if not corrected, contribute to a perception of U.S. strategic inferiority that would have severely adverse political—and could have potentially destabilizing military—consequences.

In reviewing the challenges the Soviets are posing in the strategic area, we should remember that the United States has not been idle. In the past 10 years, we have deployed more than a thousand MIRVed missiles, thereby increasing our missile warhead total nearly fourfold. SRAM (the short-range attack missile) has increased the capability of the B-52 force. Further, we have programs to improve each of the three elements of the U.S. triad of strategic forces:

- This year we will begin to put the new Trident C4 missile in our submarine fleet. In addition, the first new Trident submarine will be on patrol in late 1981, will be quieter—and thus less detectable acoustically—and will be capable of longer on-station times. We are also beginning work on a substantially improved Trident II submarine-launched missile

- Our cruise missile programs will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the bomber leg of the Triad. B-52 aircraft capable of penetrating Soviet air defenses will continue to contribute to the viability of the manned bomber leg of the Triad into the late 1980's. We are working on bomber and cruise missile technology for the longer term.

- We are improving the accuracy and yield of the Minuteman forces. We are pursuing and will choose from among a number of options for more survivable, mobile basing of part of the ICBM force to deal with the vulnerability problem. The MX missile for this purpose is funded for engineering development in the fiscal year beginning this October.

To summarize the current situation, despite Soviet military accomplishments, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has a clear military advantage, and we intend to keep it that way. Our programs are sufficient for that purpose, if we receive the support of Congress in providing the funds to carry them out.

## The Role of Arms Control

Strategic arms control provides one important way in which we can limit the military challenges we face. It is, therefore, an integral part of our overall efforts to meet our national security objectives. Thus, the SALT II agreements should be judged by the Congress and the American public first of all in terms of their contribution to our security and that of our allies. And it is in terms of this criterion that I will set forth the bulk of my evaluation of the agreement for you today.

We should recognize, however, that in addition to the more specific military security issue, the merits of SALT and the SALT process must also be judged in a broader political context. That broader context has to do with our role as leader of the Atlantic alliance, and the political damage that would be done to our status among allies and friends if the United States were seen to be neglecting, or even rejecting, strategic arms limitations. The SALT process itself is important to the further development of U.S.-Soviet and overall East-West relations. SALT is the foundation for progress in establishing an enduring political relationship with the Soviets that reduces tensions and sets important visible boundaries to our ideological, and political and military, competition.

The basic elements of the SALT II agreement are familiar to you.

A treaty, to last until 1986, that will:

- set equal limits on strategic nuclear vehicles;
- establish various sublimits on MIRVed systems (that is, ballistic missile systems carrying multiple warheads that can target more than one aim point) and heavy bombers carrying air-launched cruise missiles;

- limit each side to one new ICBM type, with a maximum of 10 reentry vehicles;
- bar increases in number of RVs on existing ICBMs; and
- provide measures to permit unimpeded verification by national technical means.

A protocol, to last about three years, that will:

- bar deployment of ground-launched and ship-launched cruise missiles with ranges greater than 600 km during that period, while permitting unimpeded testing and development of such vehicles of any range;
- bar deployment of mobile ICBMs or air-to-surface ballistic missiles during that period; and
- the treaty will permit the deployment of these systems after the protocol expires.

The agreement also includes:

- a statement of principles to guide SALT III, and
- an exchange of statements on the Soviet Backfire bomber.

SALT II is, I firmly believe, a significant and most useful step in what we hope will be a continuing process.

The 1972 SALT I agreement contributed greatly to stability. It did so by banning nationwide ABM defenses, and by capping the buildup of strategic offensive arms through limiting missile launcher numbers to those existing or under construction in 1970. The Vladivostok agreement of 1974 set equal aggregates of all strategic nuclear delivery systems at 2,400 and set a sublimit of MIRVed systems of 1,320.

In 1977, at the beginning of this Administration, we attempted to achieve a comprehensive arms control agreement that would have been substantially more restrictive than the Vladivostok agreement—or the SALT II treaty—but a

number of technological and political factors prevented success. We therefore took the dual track of trying to negotiate the largest possible reductions to the interim ceilings, while making a serious attempt to limit qualitative improvements in new systems. We have achieved real successes in both areas.

We have been able to negotiate reductions in the Vladivostok limits—to 2,250 SNDVs and 1,200 MIRVed missiles—as well as to impose a new sublimit of 820 on land-based MIRVed ICBMs, the most destabilizing strategic force element.

In addition, we have broken significant new ground in the qualitative area by limits on numbers of reentry vehicles on each type of ICBM (and SLBM) and by allowing each side only one new type of ICBM.

Taken together, these two tracks have resulted in a significant step forward in the arms control process.

The prospect of continuing the process is a major intangible at stake in the debate. But the SALT II agreement need not be defended merely as a way station to SALT III and beyond. It can be fully and convincingly justified on its own merits.

The simplest way is to observe that, without the SALT II agreement, the Soviet Union could have nearly one-third more strategic systems than with the agreement. And there would be corresponding effects on other measures. For example, instead of the 2,250 SNDVs of the treaty, they could have 3,000. Naturally, we do not know what the Soviets would do in the absence of a treaty, but these higher strategic system levels are well within their capability.

And the history of the nuclear era is strewn with the wreckage of confident U.S. predictions that the Soviets would at some point or another cease to add to force levels that were already—according to the U.S. predictors—as large as the Kremlin could possibly want. In my view, it is probable that without SALT II we would enter into an era of greater uncertainty—in both military and political terms—that would result in increased strategic forces on both sides, as hedges against that uncertainty.

Faced with such a Soviet buildup, the United States could, and I am confident would, respond. Given our determination to maintain essential equivalence, and the demonstrated Soviet willingness to avoid strategic inferiority even at great cost, the net result of such a numbers race would be greater strategic force levels at vastly greater expense and at substantial risk to stability.

The United States does not have unlimited resources to spend on strategic weapons programs without significantly affecting other defense priorities—such as improvements in conventional forces—and other government programs, such as those required to combat inflation. But we do need to spend enough, and what is enough depends in part on the actions of our adversaries.

SALT will not solve all our problems. Even with SALT we will need, and we will be permitted, to expand our strategic nuclear efforts above their present levels. Those levels, incidentally, are about half, in constant dollar terms, what they were during the mid-1960's. But SALT will mean greater stability and predictability in the strategic challenges we face, and so the balance could be maintained in a substantially lower level of destructive power. Furthermore, with SALT, it would be significantly less expensive (perhaps as much as \$30 billion less expensive over the next decade) for the United States to maintain that balance than without a SALT II agreement.

SALT II, while forestalling this pointless numbers race, will leave us the flexibility to carry out programs to deal with the challenges the treaty will not eliminate. We can develop, test and deploy each of our planned programs—cruise missiles, Trident, MX—in the fashion, and on the schedule, that we have planned. Apart from putting some distinguishing features on our ALCMs and cruise missile carriers (to aid counting under SALT), we will not be forced by SALT II to alter our strategic programs, which we need to balance Soviet programs that are allowed in SALT II and that are, in large measure, already in place.

In at least one important respect—Minuteman vulnerability—SALT II will make the solution of a problem easier than without an agreement. SALT II will limit, to well below previously projected levels the number of Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, will freeze the number of warheads on existing ballistic missile launchers, and will limit the number of RVs allowed for new ICBMs. These restrictions sharply reduce the significance of the Soviet throw-weight advantage, which without limitation, would, for example, enable them to deploy 20 or perhaps even 40 warheads on their largest ICBMs.

The combination of limitations on missile launchers and numbers of warheads will ease somewhat the difficulty of maintaining the survivability of our land-based ICBMs. The deployment of a new mobile ICBM system, regardless of basing mode, will be more feasible because an upper bound will be placed on the number of warheads that can be targeted against the aim points represented by that deployment. SALT II becomes, then, an important element in ensuring ICBM survivability.



Equally important, SALT II will leave us free to pursue with our allies the important issues of modernization of NATO's TNF (tactical nuclear forces), and to consider arms control initiatives in this area.

SALT will serve U.S. interests. It enhances the stability of the deterrent and allows us the flexibility to embark on needed modernization of our strategic forces without triggering another expensive and potentially destabilizing arms race. I do not doubt our economic or technical ability to compete successfully with the Soviets in strategic weapons. I do question whether such an effort is the best use of our national—or even defense—budget. And I do not believe that we would purchase increased security with that sort of effort.

Under the treaty, we can maintain flexible and credible deterrence, and assure essential equivalence.

Without the treaty, we could also do these things, but it would be more costly and less certain. I see the treaty as a valuable method of meeting our strategic goals—as a major component in our strategy along with our weapons program. In my judgment, it is a very important component, although we must recognize that it will have to be accompanied by substantial U.S. defense programs—expanded ones in the strategic field.

### Verification

Among the concerns expressed about the agreement one is undoubtedly in a class by itself: "Will it be verifiable?" Clearly the limits of an agreement with the USSR cannot be treated as self-enforcing. The U.S. must be able to verify with adequate confidence, by its own intelligence systems, the fact that the Soviets are complying with the agreement.

The SALT II Agreement will be verified by national technical means, including photo reconnaissance satellites and other technical measures. These means enable us to monitor many aspects of the development, testing, production, deployment, training and operation of Soviet forces. Despite the closed nature of Soviet society, we are confident that no significant violation of the treaty could take place without the United States detecting it. Because of our vigorous deployment and R&D efforts, we would be able to respond with appropriate actions before any serious adverse impact on the strategic balance could take place.

Much has recently been written about the loss of the intelligence sites in Iran and how important these sites were to have been to SALT verification. Intelligence of the kind obtained from these sites is important to our assessment of Soviet strategic forces programs, including some of the aspects limited by SALT II. We are examining alternative means of collection, and the question is not *if* we will reinstitute this capability but how, where, and how quickly we can do it. This and other verification matters will of course be discussed at length during the ratification process.

We are now well into a national debate, not only on the treaty but on our strategic policy—and on the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations. In the course of that debate, I would hope that those who consider themselves thoughtful proponents of military security and those who consider themselves thoughtful proponents of arms limitation, as well as those, among whom I number myself, who are concerned with both, can focus on the specific issue of whether our security—and with it the prospects of peace—will be better served with the treaty than without.

The President of the United States and I think the answer is clear. A sound SALT agreement is in the interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union, despite the competition between our two systems that exists elsewhere—and indeed will continue with respect to strategic nuclear forces. SALT II will provide a firmer foundation for other measures to control the growth and proliferation of nuclear and conventional capabilities throughout the world. Indeed, if the Soviet Union will emphasize cooperation rather than competition, SALT II will allow a healthier state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

All these considerations have led me to conclude that assuming the remaining issues can be resolved to our satisfaction, signature and ratification of SALT II are clearly in the national interest of the United States. In my own mind, I am satisfied with that conclusion, but I acknowledge that reasonable people of good will and high purpose may come to a different judgment. I hope that the coming debate will strengthen our understanding, strengthen our resolve to sign and approve the treaty, and in so doing, lead to a strengthening of our national security. Indeed, I am confident that, that will be the result, and that it will be a good one for all of us.

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